KENYA NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

Defence and Interior Security

ULINZI NA USALAMA YA TAIFA

The National Defence and Interior Security Vision

WORKING DOCUMENT — IN PROGRESS. Architecture and philosophy complete. Sections marked [FORTHCOMING] are pending completion.

A twenty-year programme to formalise the KDF's development role across the national corps, establish the Kenya Military Engineering Corporation and the NYS Corporation as competitive infrastructure builders, redesign the National Police Service as a functional first-world service, reform the anti-corruption architecture, and rebuild the prison system on rehabilitation principles that reduce reoffending rather than amplifying it.

Kenya National Development Programme | Defence and Interior Directorate | Year One

Preamble

A development programme of the scale and ambition of the Kenya National Development Programme does not exist in a security vacuum. Roads built into the northern corridor require workers who can survive and operate in remote and sometimes hostile environments. Water points installed in the Turkana basin require security during construction. Agricultural extension teams deploying in Mandera require protection protocols. The ASAL regions that every other programme

document targets for transformation are the same regions where security constraints have historically made sustained programme delivery impossible.

This document addresses that reality directly. It is not a conventional defence white paper — it does not redesign Kenya's military posture, its order of battle, or its strategic deterrence. Those are classified functions and this is a development document. What it designs is the interface between Kenya's security institutions and the national development programme: how the Kenya Defence Forces trains, supports, and in some cases secures the national corps; how the KDF's engineering expertise becomes a commercial competitive force through the Kenya Military Engineering Corporation; how the National Youth Service is rebuilt with a defined mission including a national fire and rescue function; how the National Police Service is redesigned as a genuinely functional institution; how the anti-corruption architecture is made to actually work; and how the prison service becomes a rehabilitation system rather than a criminal finishing school.

The document is organised in two parts. Part One — Ulinzi — addresses the defence and security functions that relate to the national programme's delivery. Part Two — Usalama — addresses the interior institutions: the police, the NYS, the fire service, immigration, anti-corruption, and the prisons. Both parts carry a draft watermark because the institutional detail in some sections — particularly the police departmental reform — requires further consultation with serving professionals before it is finalised.

PART ONE — ULINZI: DEFENCE AND THE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

SECTION ONE

The Doctrine — Defence in the Development State

1.1 What This Document Does and Does Not Cover

The Kenya Defence Forces' primary constitutional role is the defence of Kenya's territorial integrity, the protection of its citizens, and the support of constitutional order. This document does not redesign that role, does not address Kenya's military posture toward its neighbours, and does not discuss classified operational matters. What it designs is the KDF's formal development role — the legitimate, historically

established dimension of military service where engineering, medical, logistics, educational, and training capacity contributes to national development.

The distinction matters. Military institutions that blur the line between their security function and their commercial or development function tend to expand into areas where they do not belong, generating institutional conflicts and accountability gaps. KMEC — the Kenya Military Engineering Corporation designed in Section Three — is a commercial corporation, not a military operation. NYS Corporation is a commercial corporation, not a paramilitary operation. The security escort that protects KRCC road crews in Mandera is a military function with clear rules of engagement, not an open-ended deployment. Every element of the KDF's development role in this document has a defined scope, a defined accountability mechanism, and a defined boundary.

The Development-Security Nexus — The Evidence
Security operations without development produce temporary tactical gains that reverse when operations withdraw. An area cleared of armed groups but left economically undeveloped and without services will re-generate the same groups within years because the conditions that produce them are unchanged.
Development without security produces assets that are captured, taxed, or destroyed by armed groups. A water point installed without security protection in an area of active armed group activity is a water point that benefits the armed group.
The programme therefore designs security and development together in the ASAL regions — sequenced, coordinated, and mutually reinforcing. Security stabilisation precedes programme investment but is designed simultaneously with it, not after the fact.

1.2 Civil-Military Relations — The Oversight Architecture

The KDF operates under civilian oversight as mandated by the Constitution of Kenya. The programme strengthens rather than weakens this oversight in two specific ways that are relevant to the development role.

First: the KDF's development activities — KRCC security escorts, KMEC contracts, Civil-Military Medical Cooperation, corps training — are all subject to audit by the Controller and Auditor General on the same terms as civilian programme activities. There are no classified budget lines within the development role. KMEC's accounts are fully public. The cost of security escort for KRCC deployments is a published programme cost.

Second: the Parliamentary Defence and Foreign Relations Committee has jurisdiction over the KDF's development role in addition to its security role. The annual KDF development activity report is tabled in Parliament. Civilian oversight of military development activities is not a concession — it is the mechanism that keeps

the development role legitimate and prevents it from expanding beyond its defined scope.

SECTION TWO

KDF Training and Support for the National Corps

2.1 The Training Function

Every national programme corps — KRCC, KSBC, Kenya Railway Corps, Kenya Water Construction and Maintenance Corps, KNAC (Kenya National Ambulance Corps), Settlement Maintenance Corps, KLIC, Agricultural Corps, Digital Corps, Forest and Conservation Corps — deploys personnel into environments that require skills beyond standard civilian professional training. ASAL deployment requires: field survival in extreme heat and limited water; navigation without reliable road infrastructure; communication in areas without mobile coverage; first aid and basic medical care for injuries that cannot wait for hospital evacuation; and security awareness for environments with active threat. The Settlement Maintenance Corps deploys into urban informal settlements which carry their own distinct security environment — not ASAL threat, but proximity to criminality, gang territory, and community tension during infrastructure works.

The KDF provides a structured pre-deployment training programme for all corps personnel deploying into ASAL counties or remote highland areas. The programme is developed by the KDF Training and Doctrine Command in collaboration with the relevant corps directorate. It is mandatory for all personnel on their first ASAL deployment and refreshed every three years thereafter.

Training Module	Duration	KDF Unit Responsible
ASAL Field Survival	5 days residential at a KDF training facility in an ASAL environment. Water sourcing and purification, heat management, shade shelter construction, navigation by GPS and terrain feature, emergency bivouac.	Engineer Brigade and KDF Recruit Training School
Medical First	3 days. Trauma	KDF Medical Corps —

Training Module	Duration	KDF Unit Responsible
Response	management, wound care, spinal injury management, dehydration and heat stroke response, snake and scorpion envenomation. Emphasis on stabilisation for evacuation rather than definitive treatment.	building on battlefield medicine doctrine adapted for civilian field conditions
Security Awareness and Protocols	2 days. Threat recognition, movement security, communication protocols during an incident, safe haven procedures, reporting chains. Not weapons training — awareness and protocol.	Administration Police Training College in partnership with KDF
Vehicle Recovery and Field Mechanics	2 days. Recovery of vehicles stuck in sand, mud, or rocky terrain. Basic field repairs. Communication of mechanical faults to support teams.	KDF Electrical and Mechanical Engineers
Community Engagement in ASAL Contexts	1 day. Cultural protocols for the primary communities in northern Kenya — Turkana, Borana, Somali, Samburu, Rendille, Pokot. Conflict sensitivity. Working with local community leaders.	Administration Police and county government input

2.2 Battlefield Medicine Transfer — The Ambulance Corps

The Kenya Ambulance and Emergency Medical Corps operates in environments — mass casualty incidents, remote emergency response, post-disaster situations — that share characteristics with military medical operations. The KDF Medical Corps has developed expertise in: mass casualty triage and management, improvised casualty

care in resource-limited environments, haemorrhage control under field conditions, and extended patient care during prolonged evacuation. This expertise does not exist in the same depth in civilian emergency medicine.

The programme establishes a formal knowledge transfer pipeline between the KDF Medical Corps and the Ambulance Corps. The specific instruments:

- A joint training module — Combat and Casualty Care Adapted for Civilian Emergency Medicine — delivered twice yearly at the KDF Medical Training Centre in Nairobi. Places allocated: 30 senior Ambulance Corps paramedics per cohort.
- A KDF Medical Corps officer seconded to the Ambulance Corps Training Institute for a two-year tour, contributing to curriculum development and practical instruction.
- An Ambulance Corps officer seconded to the KDF Medical Corps for a two-year tour, gaining operational exposure to military medical standards and returning to embed those standards in civilian practice.
- A shared mass casualty exercise annually — a simulated major incident jointly managed by Ambulance Corps and KDF Medical Corps teams, building interoperability for the real events that occur when both organisations deploy simultaneously.

2.2b KNAC Air Wing — Kenya Air Force Airspace Coordination

The KNAC air wing operates night-capable medical helicopters at four air bases — Nairobi Wilson, Mombasa Moi, Kisumu, and Eldoret International — and deploys to all 47 counties for remote emergency response. The Kenya Air Force manages controlled airspace across all four zones. A civilian medical helicopter operating at night in controlled airspace requires coordination protocols that do not exist between the KNAC and the Kenya Air Force in the current system.

Coordination Instrument	Specification
Standing airspace access agreement	The KAF and KNAC execute a standing Airspace Access Agreement from Year 1 of KNAC's air wing operations. The agreement grants KNAC medical helicopters priority routing through controlled airspace on declared medical emergency flights. ATC facilities at Wilson, Mombasa, Kisumu, and Eldoret are briefed annually on KNAC aircraft call signs and emergency routing protocols.
Frequency allocation	A dedicated KNAC air emergency frequency is allocated by the Kenya Civil Aviation Authority, with monitoring at KAF ATC facilities. A KNAC medical flight declares on

Coordination Instrument	Specification
	the dedicated frequency and receives immediate routing without standard commercial ATC queue.
Night operations protocol	Night medical flights require active illumination guidance where landing zones are unlit. The KAF provides mobile landing zone illumination support for KNAC helicopter deployments to dark or remote sites where KNAC's own ground crew cannot pre-illuminate. Joint exercise annually — a simulated night remote evacuation with KAF and KNAC teams operating together.
Mass casualty interface	In any mass casualty event — train derailment, industrial accident, natural disaster — both KNAC and KAF assets may deploy simultaneously. The KAF's air transport command provides heavy lift capacity for triage to major hospitals when KNAC's rotary wing capacity is saturated. A Mass Casualty Air Coordination Protocol governs the interface — published jointly by the KNAC DG and the Chief of Air Staff.

2.3 Security Escort for Corps Deployments

Corps personnel deploying into areas with active security threats — primarily Mandera, Wajir, and parts of Turkana and West Pokot — receive security escort during construction and operational phases. The escort is provided by the Administration Police in the first instance, with KDF mobile support available in areas of active armed group threat as assessed by the National Intelligence Service.

Escort Element	Specification
Decision authority	The decision to provide KDF rather than AP escort is made by the County Security Committee with input from the NIS. It is not a routine administrative decision — it requires a current threat assessment and a proportionality review.
Rules of engagement	KDF escort personnel operate under rules of engagement approved by the Chief of Defence Forces and reviewed by the Inspector General of Defence. The rules are defensive — the escort's role is to protect the corps team, not to conduct offensive operations. Any offensive engagement requires separate authorisation under standing military orders.
Cost sharing	Security escort costs for corps deployments are shared

Escort Element	Specification
	between the Defence budget and the relevant programme budget in a ratio of 60:40 — the state bears the majority of security cost as a public good function, the programme bears the minority as a programme delivery cost. Published annually in both the Defence report and the programme delivery report.
Review trigger	Any escort engagement that results in use of force is subject to an automatic review by the Independent Police Oversight Authority (for AP escort) or the Inspector General of Defence (for KDF escort). Review outcomes are published.

2.4 The Civil-Military Medical Cooperation Framework

The KDF military hospital system — the Kenyatta National Hospital military wing, the Kahawa Military Hospital, and the KDF Medical Reception Stations in ASAL garrisons — has clinical capacity that is underutilised by the civilian population. In areas where county health infrastructure is absent or overwhelmed, KDF medical facilities can serve civilian populations under the Civil-Military Medical Cooperation Framework.

The CMMC Framework operates under a standing agreement between the Health Directorate and the KDF Medical Corps. KDF medical facilities in ASAL garrison towns — Moyale, Mandera, Wajir, Garissa, Lodwar — designate specific clinic sessions for civilian populations. KDF medical personnel participate in the county community health worker programme. In disaster and mass casualty events, KDF medical assets are automatically available to the county health emergency response. The costs of civilian care in KDF facilities are reimbursed at county hospital rates from the Health programme budget.

SECTION THREE

The Kenya Military Engineering Corporation

3.1 The Design Logic

The Kenya Defence Forces' Engineer Brigade has built bridges, roads, and strategic infrastructure in Kenya for decades. Its capacity is real, its engineering standards are high, and its ability to operate in difficult terrain and under adverse conditions is

greater than any civilian contractor. Currently this capacity is used primarily for military purposes and for ad hoc humanitarian operations. It is not organised as a competitive commercial entity. The result is that a major national engineering asset sits outside the commercial construction market, providing no competitive pressure on private contractors and generating no commercial return for the state.

The Kenya Military Engineering Corporation resolves this. KMEC is a state-owned commercial corporation — structured like KSBC but owned by the KDF through a holding structure — that bids competitively for major infrastructure contracts under full PPADA compliance. It does not receive reserved contracts. It wins on merit, on price, and on capability. Its presence in every major tender is the benchmark that disciplines private contractor pricing and the anti-corruption pressure that KSBC provides in the building sector.

KMEC's Three Competitive Advantages
TERRAIN CAPABILITY: KMEC can build in environments where civilian contractors will not go — active security zones, extreme ASAL terrain, immediate post-disaster environments, areas accessible only by military logistics. This is not a niche — the national programme's most critical infrastructure needs are often in exactly these environments.
THE BENCHMARK: When KMEC submits a competitive bid for a major bridge or tunnel, every private contractor in that tender knows it must price against an entity with military engineering standards, no private shareholder margin requirements, and full cost transparency to the procuring entity. KMEC's presence disciplines the market.
STRATEGIC CAPABILITY: For infrastructure with national security implications — cross-border bridges, strategic transmission lines, port security infrastructure, the SGR extension in difficult terrain — the government has a legitimate interest in a capable Kenyan entity being in the contractor position. KMEC provides this without requiring reserved contracts.

3.2 The Corporate Structure

Element	Specification
Legal form	Incorporated under the Companies Act as a state-owned enterprise. Wholly owned by the Kenya Government through the KDF holding structure. Not a parastatal — a company with a board and commercial governance.
Board composition	Seven directors: three independent non-executive directors appointed through open competitive process (must include at least one civil engineer and one financial professional); two KDF representatives (non-voting on

Element	Specification
	commercial matters); two government representatives from Treasury and the Infrastructure Ministry. Chair is an independent non-executive director.
Accountability	Annual accounts audited by a Big Four firm and reviewed by the Controller and Auditor General. Accounts published on KMEC's website and in the Kenya Gazette. Parliamentary reporting through the Defence Committee. No classified accounts — KMEC's commercial operations are fully transparent.
Personnel model	Mix of: serving KDF engineers seconded at military salary plus KMEC supplement; retired KDF engineers employed as civilians; civilian engineers recruited commercially. Seconded officers are operationally accountable to KMEC's civilian CEO during their secondment. The KDF chain of command has no authority over KMEC's commercial operations.
CEO	Appointed by the board through open competitive process. Civil engineer with minimum 15 years large infrastructure experience. Not a serving military officer — the CEO is a civilian professional accountable to the board.
Procurement	Full PPADA compliance for all KMEC purchases. KMEC does not receive any preferential procurement status. It competes on equal terms with private contractors. Its own purchases — equipment, materials, sub-contracts — go through its published procurement policy, audited by the CAG.

3.3 The Strategic Infrastructure Mandate

KMEC has a specific mandate for strategic infrastructure — projects where the government has a national security or strategic interest in a capable Kenyan entity being in the contractor position, or where the terrain and security conditions make civilian contractor deployment impractical. This mandate does not override PPADA — KMEC still bids competitively. But it shapes KMEC's business development focus and its capability investment decisions.

Infrastructure Category	KMEC Mandate	Examples
Cross-border infrastructure	KMEC is the preferred Kenyan bidder for EAC	The Taveta-Moshi bridge. The Moyale border infrastructure. EAC road corridor improvements.

Infrastructure Category	KMEC Mandate	Examples
	connectivity projects — bridges, border facilities, shared infrastructure. Not reserved — preferred where capability and price are competitive.	
ASAL strategic infrastructure	Where civilian contractors require security conditions that the market cannot currently provide, KMEC deploys with integral security capability.	Northern Ring transmission line towers in Turkana. Roads in Mandera. Water infrastructure in West Pokot.
Tunnels and complex bridges	KMEC develops specialist tunnelling and major bridge capability — not currently present in Kenya's civilian contractor market. This fills a genuine gap.	The SGR extension tunnels through the Rift Valley escarpment. Major river crossings on the Northern Ring road.
Post-disaster reconstruction	In major floods, landslides, or other disasters requiring immediate infrastructure repair, KMEC deploys without a procurement process under an emergency framework — restoring access roads, temporary bridges, communications infrastructure	Flood damage repair on the Tana River road network. Landslide clearance on the Mt Kenya escarpment roads.

Infrastructure Category	KMEC Mandate	Examples
	within 72 hours.	
Port and strategic facility security infrastructure	Security-sensitive construction at Mombasa Port, at the Naivasha ICD, at strategic power infrastructure.	Perimeter security infrastructure at Olkaria geothermal fields. Port security infrastructure at Kilindini.

SECTION FOUR

The ASAL Security and Development Framework

4.1 The Joint Planning Process

The ASAL Security and Development Framework is a coordinated planning process — not a single document but an ongoing institutional mechanism — that ensures security stabilisation and programme investment in ASAL counties are sequenced and designed together rather than in separate ministerial silos. It is convened at county level by the County Security Committee, chaired by the County Commissioner, with participation from: the relevant corps directorate representatives, the KDF garrison commander, the Administration Police county commander, the NIS county coordinator, and the county programme delivery officer.

The Framework operates on a six-monthly cycle: threat assessment and security planning in months one and two; programme delivery planning against the security assessment in months two and three; joint implementation with security escort arrangements confirmed before any team deploys; and joint review of outcomes in month six feeding the next cycle. The Framework is not a bureaucratic meeting — it is a genuine operational planning process that determines whether and how programme delivery proceeds in each ASAL sub-county.

4.2 Inter-Community Violence and the Cattle Rustling Response

Cattle rustling and inter-community conflict in northern Kenya is not simply a crime problem. It is a livelihood conflict problem driven by scarcity — particularly water and grazing scarcity — that is intensified by the proliferation of small arms from the

region's conflict neighbourhoods. Economic development and water programme delivery that reduces the scarcity pressure is the long-term solution. Security response is the short-term stabilisation requirement. Neither alone produces lasting peace.

The programme's response to inter-community violence is designed across three layers simultaneously:

- Security layer: the Administration Police Rapid Deployment Unit provides a credible response to active rustling incidents. The KDF provides intelligence support and, in cases of armed group involvement, mobile security. The objective is not the elimination of rustling culture — that is a generational change — but the reduction of lethal violence to the point where programme delivery is possible.
- Economic layer: the Maji ya Taifa water point programme and the Shamba la Taifa pastoral development programme directly reduce the scarcity pressure that drives raiding. A community with reliable water access year-round has less incentive to raid a neighbouring community's water source. The water programme's ASAL deployment is sequenced with the security framework precisely to deliver this reduction.
- Governance layer: the county government's Alternative Dispute Resolution programme — elder councils, inter-community peace committees, traditional conflict resolution mechanisms — is supported and resourced by the programme rather than bypassed by formal courts that communities do not trust and cannot access.

4.3 The Al-Shabaab Threat — The Current Baseline

The containment of al-Shabaab's operational reach in northeastern Kenya is an ongoing KDF, AP, and NIS operation that predates this programme and will continue beyond its horizon. The programme does not redesign counter-terrorism operations — those are security functions managed through classified channels. What the programme does is acknowledge that programme delivery in Mandera, Wajir, and parts of Garissa operates within a specific threat environment and design the security architecture for that environment.

The operative principle: the threat level in any specific sub-county at any specific time determines the delivery model, not the other way around. When the threat level permits routine civilian corps deployment with AP escort, that is the model. When the threat level requires KDF escort, that model is activated. When the threat level makes any deployment inadvisable, programme delivery pauses in that specific sub-county and resumes when conditions allow. The programme accepts that some ASAL delivery will be non-linear — periods of progress followed by security-driven pauses — and plans its delivery timelines accordingly.

SECTION FIVE

Civil-Military Relations — The Oversight Architecture

5.1 The Constitutional Framework

The KDF operates under Articles 239-241 of the Constitution of Kenya. The National Security Council — chaired by the President — provides civilian direction of security policy. Parliament exercises oversight through the Defence and Foreign Relations Committee. The Inspector General of Defence provides internal audit and compliance. None of this is new. What the national programme adds is a specific development accountability layer: every KDF development activity is reported, costed, and audited as programme expenditure, not as classified defence expenditure.

Oversight Mechanism	Function in Development Context
Controller and Auditor General	Audits all KMEC accounts, all Civil-Military Medical Cooperation reimbursements, all security escort cost-sharing arrangements. Publishes findings in the annual audit report. No classified exemptions for development activities.
Parliamentary Defence Committee	Receives annual KDF Development Activity Report covering: corps training delivered, security escorts conducted, KMEC contracts won and delivered, CMMC framework utilisation. The report is public and tabled in Parliament.
Inspector General of Defence	Reviews all use of force incidents during security escort operations. Reviews all KMEC procurement above Ksh 500 million. Publishes annual compliance report.
National Programme Coordination Office	The body that coordinates the national programme (designed in the Synthesis document) has a Civil-Military Liaison function that manages the interface between corps directorates and KDF support activities. This function ensures that requests for KDF support go through a structured process, not informal channels.

PART TWO — USALAMA: INTERIOR SECURITY

SECTION SIX

The National Police Service — Full Reform

6.1 The Honest Assessment

The National Police Service is simultaneously the national programme's most important partner institution and one of its most significant structural vulnerabilities. Without a police service that communities trust, the housing upgrading programme cannot reach the settlements it is designed to serve. Without traffic police who enforce road safety rather than collect personal income, KRCC's roads cannot fulfil their purpose. Without a cybercrime unit, the digital infrastructure programme creates unmanaged vulnerability. Without a credible Gender Violence Investigation Unit, Jinsia ya Taifa's SGBV response architecture has no prosecution end.

The problems are documented, persistent, and structural. Extrajudicial killing in poor urban communities. Systematic bribe collection at traffic stops. Cases that disappear when the suspect has connections. A complaints system that investigates nothing. Ethnic concentration in senior appointments. The reform required is not cosmetic — it is the redesign of the institution's operating model, performance management system, departmental structure, and accountability architecture simultaneously.

The Three Structural Failures
FAILURE ONE — PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT: Officers are measured on arrests made and fines collected. This creates incentives to arrest people who should not be arrested and to collect money that should not be collected. A first-world police service measures response time, case resolution rate, and community trust. When promotion depends on community trust scores, officer behaviour changes.
FAILURE TWO — ACCOUNTABILITY VACUUM: The Internal Affairs Unit investigates complaints against police. Police investigating police is not accountability — it is reputation management. The Independent Police Oversight Authority has the right mandate but has been denied the access, resources, and enforcement power it needs to function. This changes.

FAILURE THREE — DEPARTMENTAL CONFUSION: Multiple police functions with overlapping mandates, unclear reporting lines, and competition for resources rather than coordination. The reform separates functions clearly, gives each department a specific mandate and a specific accountability mechanism, and builds the coordination infrastructure that allows them to work together without duplicating each other.

6.2 The Departmental Structure — Separated and Functionalised

The reformed National Police Service operates through eight functionally distinct departments. Each has its own directorate, its own specialist training pathway, its own performance metrics, and its own chain of command — while connecting to the others through a national operations centre that provides real-time visibility and coordination.

Department	Mandate and Key Reform
Uniform Patrol and Response	The visible daily policing function. Community officers, patrol vehicles, emergency response. The primary community interface. Performance measured on: response time to emergency calls (target: 10 minutes urban, 30 minutes peri-urban); community trust score from the annual Citizen Security Survey; use of force incidents per 1,000 arrests (target: declining year on year). All patrol officers carry body cameras from Year Two. Camera deactivation during a response incident is a disciplinary offence.
Criminal Investigations Directorate (CID)	Detectives, forensic scientists, intelligence analysts. Operationally independent of uniform patrol — a detective investigating a crime involving a senior patrol officer does not report through that officer's command chain. Forensic laboratory upgraded to international standard by Year Three. Digital evidence capability built into the forensic laboratory. Case management system — every case has a digital file, a unique reference, and a 30-day supervisor alert if no progress is recorded.
Traffic Safety Service	Complete redesign. Traffic policing is separated from general patrol and becomes a distinct service with a specific road safety mandate. All fines collected through M-Pesa directly to government — no cash transactions. Every traffic officer wears a body camera. Automated number plate recognition at 200 major junctions by Year Five feeds a central database.

Department	Mandate and Key Reform
	Performance measured on: road fatality rate (national target 50% reduction by Year Ten); fine compliance rate; complaints upheld against officers. Traffic officers who accept cash bribes are dismissed and prosecuted — no warnings, no transfer.
Rail Police Unit	New department. The Kenya Railway Corps operates 4,572km across nine Corridor Battalions — the largest single infrastructure footprint in the programme and one of the largest in East Africa. Mandate: security of rail infrastructure (track, signalling, rolling stock, Isiolo Inland Depot), freight theft prevention on the corridor, passenger safety, and coordination with KRC Corridor Battalion security protocols. Each of the nine corridor zones has a dedicated Rail Police sub-unit co-located with the KRC Corridor Battalion operations centre. Officers receive specific training in: rail infrastructure vulnerability points, freight security in high-value commodity corridors (the Northern Spine connects to Mrima Hill rare earths and Lake Turkana oil), cross-border coordination with Ugandan, Tanzanian, and Ethiopian rail police counterparts. The Rail Police Unit Director maintains a standing coordination arrangement with the KRC Corps Commander.
Settlement Maintenance Corps Community Interface	The Settlement Maintenance Corps deploys 40,000–60,000 permanent ward-level staff into Kenya's urban informal settlements — the same environments that are the primary challenge for the Uniform Patrol and Response department. The SMC operates the visible public infrastructure: the street lights, the drainage channels, the community spaces, the waste collection. SMC staff are present in every ward every day — they are the programme's most persistent physical presence in informal settlements. This creates both an opportunity and a responsibility: the SMC-NPS relationship must be clearly defined from Year 1. The NPS Community Policing department and the SMC Ward Maintenance Units operate a joint quarterly review in every urban county — sharing intelligence on environmental security risks (broken lights, blocked drainage creating flooding, waste accumulation creating fire hazard) and coordinating on the physical conditions that either reduce or amplify crime risk. The SMC is not an intelligence asset for the police. It is a partner in environmental security — the 'eyes on the street' literature applied to a structured institutional relationship.

Department	Mandate and Key Reform
Cybercrime and Digital Forensics Unit	New department. Kenya's expanding digital infrastructure — ArdhiSasa, NHB systems, NIAS, the EAC digital single market — creates significant cybercrime surface. The unit handles: financial cybercrime, identity fraud, infrastructure attacks, online SGBV, digital evidence for all criminal cases. Staffed by officers with computer science or digital forensics qualifications at KNQF Level 5 or above. International liaison with Interpol's cybercrime division and with East African police services. Operates a 24-hour cybercrime reporting line.
Gender Violence Investigation Unit (GVIU)	New department, distinct from the Gender Desk community response function. GVIU detectives investigate SGBV cases — sexual assault, domestic violence, trafficking, female genital mutilation. All GVIU officers complete a minimum 80-hour specialist training programme in trauma-informed investigation, forensic evidence collection for sexual assault, and SGBV case management. GVIU works directly with the SGBV courts and the National Legal Aid Service. Case management system tracks every GVIU case from report to prosecution outcome.
Environmental and Wildlife Crime Unit	New department. As the mining programme, the forest restoration programme, and the conservation economy grow, environmental crime — illegal mining, poaching, illegal logging, hazardous waste dumping, pollution of water sources — becomes economically significant. The unit operates in partnership with KWS, KFS, and NEMA. Officers trained in environmental law, evidence collection in natural environments, and coordination with prosecution.
Financial Crimes Unit	New department. Works directly with the KIACC (anti-corruption commission) and the Assets Recovery Agency. Handles: procurement fraud investigation, money laundering, tax evasion, financial sector fraud. Staffed by officers with forensic accounting training. Access to the Kenya Revenue Authority's tax intelligence data. Mandate includes investigation of corruption in national programme contracts — the mechanism that makes the programme's anti-corruption commitments enforceable.

6.3 The Digitisation Programme

A first-world police service is a data-driven institution. Every interaction is recorded. Every case is tracked. Every outcome is measured. Corruption and misconduct thrive in opacity — they cannot survive systematic digital visibility.

System	Specification	Timeline
Body camera programme	Mandatory for all uniform patrol and traffic officers. Camera activates automatically when officer exits vehicle or unholsters equipment. Footage uploaded to secure server managed by IPOA — not by the police. Footage retained for 2 years. Available for any complaint investigation within 48 hours of request.	Year Two: all urban patrol officers. Year Four: all patrol officers nationally.
Digital case management	Every crime report generates a unique reference number given to the complainant at point of report. Complainant tracks case status online or by SMS. Case inactivity for 30 days generates automatic supervisor alert. Cases cannot be administratively closed without supervisory sign-off and documented reason.	Year One: Nairobi and Mombasa. Year Three: all 47 counties.
Digital evidence management	Chain-of-custody system for all physical evidence. Evidence logged with time, location, officer, and case reference at every transfer point. Tampering or disappearance of evidence leaves a digital trace that generates an automatic audit.	Year Two: all major police stations.
National Operations Centre	Real-time visibility of patrol deployment across all counties. Incident mapping. Resource allocation based on real-time demand data.	Year Three: operational.

System	Specification	Timeline
	Communication between all departments through a secure digital platform. Replaces radio-based command-and-control that loses information and creates gaps.	
Traffic — M-Pesa enforcement	All traffic fines paid through M-Pesa or USSD directly to government account. Automatic digital receipt to offender. Officer records fine on a digital device that transmits to the central system. No cash changes hands at any point. Non-payment of a recorded fine triggers automated follow-up.	Year One: Nairobi. Year Two: all major highways. Year Four: national.
Automated Number Plate Recognition	ANPR cameras at 200 major junctions nationally by Year Five. Feeds a central database linked to: stolen vehicle register, outstanding warrant register, insurance compliance database. Real-time alert to the nearest patrol unit when a flagged vehicle is detected.	Year Two: 50 cameras. Year Five: 200 cameras.

6.4 Community Policing as the Operating Model

Community policing is not a programme. It is an operating model — the fundamental orientation of the institution toward the communities it serves. The shift from control-oriented to community-safety-oriented policing is achieved through performance management, not through training alone.

Element	Specification
Annual Citizen Security Survey	Conducted independently by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics. Every police station area is surveyed annually. Questions: do you feel safe in your community? Do you trust the police in your area? Have you or a family member experienced police misconduct in the past year?

Element	Specification
	The survey results by station are published publicly. They are incorporated into the performance assessment of every officer above constable in that station area.
Community Policing Committees	Every sub-location has a Community Policing Committee — a civilian body that meets monthly with the local police commander, receives a briefing on crime patterns in their area, provides intelligence on community concerns, and logs any complaints about police conduct. The CPC is not a police body — it is a civilian oversight mechanism at the community level. CPC minutes are kept and available to IPOA on request.
Officer assignment stability	Officers are assigned to a specific community for a minimum of two years. The current practice of frequent reassignment prevents officers from developing community knowledge and community trust. Reassignment before two years requires supervisory justification. Exception: reassignment following a substantiated complaint, which is mandatory.
IPOA — Real Powers	The Independent Police Oversight Authority receives: automatic notification of all use of force incidents within 24 hours; access to body camera footage on request within 48 hours; access to the digital case management system; and the power to refer cases directly to the DPP without police consent. IPOA investigators are civilians. IPOA's budget is allocated by Parliament directly, not through the Interior Ministry.

6.5 Conditions of Service — Reducing the Corruption Incentive

Corruption in policing is not simply a values failure. It is partly a rational economic response to inadequate pay, poor housing, and an institutional culture that normalises supplementary income. The reform addresses both the values dimension (through training, performance management, and accountability) and the economic dimension (through conditions of service improvement that reduce the financial pressure to supplement income through misconduct).

The specific improvements: police housing — a programme of purpose-built police accommodation at major stations, replacing the current dilapidated housing that demoralises officers and their families; a genuine salary scale with transparent progression, removing the discretionary pay supplements that create dependency on senior officers; a police health insurance scheme under the reformed NHIF; and a transparent promotion system based on published criteria including community

trust scores, case resolution rates, and absence of substantiated complaints — not on patronage networks.

SECTION SEVEN

The National Youth Service — Redefined and Rebuilt

7.1 The Honest Reckoning

The NYS corruption scandals of 2015-2018 were not marginal failures. Billions of shillings were stolen through systematically fraudulent procurement. Multiple Cabinet Secretaries were implicated. The institution's credibility was destroyed and its operational capacity was severely damaged. A document that rehabilitates the NYS through administrative optimism would be dishonest. The NYS must earn trust back through structural reform and demonstrated performance over time.

At the same time, the NYS fills a genuine institutional space that the corps do not cover. The corps are project-based, qualification-driven, and career-pathway institutions. They are not designed for young people who need structured experience before they are ready for a corps pathway, for daily municipal operations that are not project-based, or for on-call emergency response that requires a standing capacity. The NYS, properly reformed, fills these gaps.

The NYS Redefined — Three Functions
FUNCTION ONE — THE PIPELINE: The NYS is the structured pre-corps experience for young Kenyans between 18 and 22 who want to contribute to national development but are not yet qualified for a direct corps entry. Twelve months of NYS provides: KNQF Level 3 vocational training in a corps discipline, basic physical and field training with KDF input, NIAS assessment, and a corps referral. NYS graduates enter corps pathways as trained entry-level operatives, not as raw recruits.
FUNCTION TWO — FIRE AND RESCUE: The NYS is the institutional home of the National Fire and Rescue Service. The fire service is a major operational institution in its own right — designed in Section Eight. NYS recruits with appropriate aptitude move into fire and rescue training. The fire service is the NYS's most important operational function and the one that most clearly justifies the institution's existence.
FUNCTION THREE — DAILY OPERATIONS AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE: Municipal support operations, disaster response staging, flood and drought response logistics, and the kind of rapid deployment for routine national needs

that the project-based corps are not designed for. The NYS maintains a standing operational capacity for these functions.

7.2 The Governance Reform — From Scandal to Institution

Governance Element	Specification
Independent Board	An independent board of nine directors: four independent non-executive directors (at least one engineer, one educator, one finance professional, and one public safety expert); two government representatives (Interior and Treasury); one representative of county governments; one representative of the NYS staff association; one representative of NYS alumni. Chair is an independent non-executive director appointed through open competitive process. The NYS Director General is appointed by the board, not by the Cabinet Secretary.
Procurement reform	All NYS procurement above Ksh 500,000 is conducted through the PPADA system with published results. No single-source procurement without public justification and Treasury approval. The CAG conducts a full procurement audit of the NYS annually. Any procurement officer found to have participated in fraudulent procurement is dismissed, prosecuted, and permanently barred from public service. No transfer, no warning, no second chance.
Published accounts	NYS annual accounts are published within four months of the financial year end. Accounts are audited by an external firm and reviewed by the CAG. The accounts include: per-recruit training cost, income from NYSC contracts, operational expenditure breakdown, asset register. The opacity that enabled the corruption scandals is structurally eliminated.
Separation of commercial and operational	The NYS operational function (pipeline training, fire service, daily operations) is managed by the NYS Directorate. The commercial function (NYSC contracts) is managed by the NYS Corporation with its own board, its own accounts, and its own CEO. The Director General of NYS is not the CEO of NYSC — they are separate roles with separate accountability. Funds do not flow between the two without Treasury approval.

7.3 The NYS Corporation (NYSC)

The NYS Corporation is the commercial construction arm of the NYS — structured on the same model as KMEC. It bids competitively for infrastructure contracts under full PPADA compliance. It does not receive reserved contracts. It wins on merit, capability, and price. Its primary competitive advantage is its workforce: NYS graduates with KNQF Level 3 training in construction, civil works, or a related discipline who are employed at competitive wages with the NYS providing accommodation and transport on project sites.

NYSC specialises in the scale range between what Tier 2 private contractors can manage and what KSBC or KMEC typically bid for: community halls, rural health facilities, school construction and upgrade, minor road works, water point civil works. This is the scale of infrastructure that the national programme needs most in terms of volume — not the major bridges and highways but the community-level fabric that the housing, health, education, and water programmes require.

NYSC's third competitive value — after the benchmark effect and the capability — is training volume. Every NYSC project is a training site. NYS recruits work on real projects under qualified supervisors, accumulating the practical experience that converts a KNQF Level 3 certificate into genuine competence. The project is simultaneously a construction delivery and a training delivery. This makes NYSC's cost structure different from a purely commercial contractor — the training subsidy from the NYS Directorate covers part of the workforce cost, making NYSC competitive at a price point that a private contractor paying full commercial wages cannot match.

SECTION EIGHT

The National Fire and Rescue Service

8.1 The Current Inadequacy

Kenya's fire service is chronically under-resourced, under-equipped, and concentrated in major urban centres in ways that leave the expanding national programme infrastructure — factories, mines, auditoriums, CRCs, housing blocks, the film studio, fuel storage — with inadequate fire protection. As the national programme expands, the consequences of fire service inadequacy become increasingly severe: a fire at the Dongo Kundu steel plant, at a densely occupied social housing block, at an auditorium during a performance, or at a fuel storage facility has consequences that dwarf the cost of an adequate preventive service.

The National Fire and Rescue Service is designed on the same institutional model as the Ambulance Corps — a professional, nationally networked emergency service

with defined response standards, specialist training, and adequate equipment — housed within the NYS as the primary institutional home for its workforce pipeline.

Element	Specification	Cross-Programme Link
Regional fire stations	Every county headquarters has a Level 1 fire station: minimum two fire appliances, one aerial platform, one hazmat unit, crew of 20 on continuous shift rotation. Every major town above 50,000 population has a Level 2 station: two appliances, crew of 10. Every industrial zone (Dongo Kundu, Thika, Eldoret, Kisumu Port) has a dedicated industrial fire station co-located with the zone.	Nyumba ya Taifa housing blocks, Viwanda ya Taifa industrial zones, Utamaduni wa Taifa auditoriums and CRCs, Madini ya Taifa mining operations
Response time standards	Level 1 urban station: 8 minutes maximum response to any point in the urban area. Level 2 town station: 12 minutes. Industrial station: 5 minutes to any point in the industrial zone. ASAL and rural: 30 minutes to any classified settlement, using air support (helicopter) where road response time exceeds this.	Nishati ya Taifa: industrial fire risk at power generation facilities
Specialist capabilities	Hazardous materials unit at every Level 1 station. High-rise rescue capability (Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu — where high-rise housing programme will produce tall buildings). Marine fire and rescue (Mombasa Port, Lake Victoria ports). Mine rescue units co-located with the Kwale and Kitui mining operations.	Madini ya Taifa mine safety, Maji ya Taifa lake transport safety
Training pipeline	The NYS fire and rescue training programme: 6-month initial training at the	Kazi ya Taifa: NYS pipeline function

Element	Specification	Cross-Programme Link
	NYS Fire and Rescue Training College (new facility, Nairobi). Annual refresher. Specialist training (hazmat, high-rise, marine) at specialist centres. Progression: firefighter → crew commander → watch manager → station manager → area manager. KNQF Level 3 at entry, Level 5 at watch manager.	
Ambulance Corps integration	Joint response protocols for incidents requiring both fire and medical response. Shared dispatch system: a single 911 call routes to both services simultaneously for relevant incident types. Joint mass casualty exercises annually.	Afya ya Taifa: Ambulance Corps

The fire service is funded through a combination of: national government allocation (60%), a fire safety levy on industrial operations and large commercial buildings of 0.1% of insured value annually (30%), and county government contribution (10%). The industrial levy is both a funding mechanism and an incentive — buildings that achieve a higher fire safety rating pay a lower levy rate, creating a direct financial incentive for fire safety investment.

SECTION NINE

Immigration and Border Management

9.1 The EAC Free Movement Implementation

The Diplomasia ya Taifa document establishes EAC free movement as a policy commitment. The interior document operationalises it — which is harder than the policy commitment and requires specific institutional design at every border post. Free movement of EAC citizens is not merely a relaxation of border controls. It is a redesign of what a border does.

Element	Specification
EAC Biometric Identity Card	A single EAC biometric ID card — containing the same biometric data as the national ID — that serves as the only document required for any EAC citizen to cross any EAC internal border. No passport. No visa. No work permit for stays up to 6 months. The card is issued by the national ID authority of each member state to its own citizens and recognised by all EAC member states. Kenya's rollout: all Kenyan citizens above 18 who hold a national ID are eligible for the EAC card on application. Target: 10 million EAC cards issued by Year Three.
One-Stop Border Posts	The OSBP model — joint inspection by a single team rather than sequential inspection by multiple agencies — is extended to all major EAC border crossings. At an OSBP, a commercial truck is inspected once by a joint Kenya-Uganda or Kenya-Tanzania team, not twice by each country's team in sequence. The 4-hour commercial freight crossing target requires OSBP at all major crossings by Year Five.
EAC Border Management System	A shared digital system across all EAC member states: real-time crossing records, shared wanted persons database, shared stolen vehicle database, mutual recognition of customs declarations. A Rwandan truck with a customs declaration from Kigali crosses Kenya without re-examination if the declaration is in the EAC Border Management System.
The northeastern border	The Kenya-Somalia border requires a specific management model that accommodates free movement for the Somali-Kenyan community (who have cross-border family and economic ties that precede the national boundary) while managing the security dimension. The approach: designated crossing points with biometric registration, a frequent crosser programme for established traders and community members, and security intelligence integration at crossing points without making routine crossing a security ordeal for the majority of crossers who have no security risk.

9.2 The Biometric Passport Reform

Kenya's current passport system is slow, expensive, and inaccessible to rural Kenyans who need to travel to a major city to apply. The reform: full online application with biometric capture at any NPS station or Huduma Centre; 10-day processing target for standard applications (from current 3-6 weeks); a diaspora

passport renewal service through Kenyan diplomatic missions overseas; and a reduction in passport cost to Ksh 3,000 for the standard 10-year passport (from Ksh 4,550). The 10-year passport at accessible cost is the document that enables Kenyan participation in the African Connectivity Compact's people's mobility programme.

SECTION TEN

The Kenya Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission

10.1 Why the EACC Has Failed

The Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission has existed in various forms since 2003. It has a mandate, a board, and a staff. It has not significantly reduced corruption in Kenya. The reasons are structural, not personal. The chain from identification to investigation to prosecution to conviction to asset recovery is broken at every link. The CAG identifies irregular expenditure; the report is debated and forgotten. The EACC opens investigations; cases stall for years. The DPP receives referrals; some are declined without explanation. Courts hear cases; they take a decade to conclude. Assets are traced; they are moved offshore before orders are obtained. The corruption continues because the system is not designed to stop it.

The Reformed Chain — Every Link Fixed
LINK ONE — IDENTIFICATION: CAG flags irregular expenditure above Ksh 10 million → automatic referral to KIACC within 30 days. KIACC acknowledges publicly and opens investigation or gives written reasons for not doing so within 60 days. Reasons are published.
LINK TWO — INVESTIGATION: KIACC's 50-strong forensic accounting unit investigates financial crimes. Access to KRA tax data, bank account data under court order, procurement records. Cases above Ksh 100 million are investigated by the forensic accounting unit. Cases below are investigated by county KIACC offices.
LINK THREE — PROSECUTION: KIACC prosecutes cases above Ksh 100 million through its own prosecution team without DPP approval. DPP retains the right to take over any case but must provide written reasons if taking over would result in abandonment. Written reasons are published.
LINK FOUR — ADJUDICATION: The Anti-Corruption Court Division of the High Court operates on a dedicated docket with time-bound case management. Cases must conclude within 2 years of charge. Extensions require judicial approval with published reasons.

LINK FIVE — ASSET RECOVERY: The Fast-Track Asset Recovery Division freezes assets within 48 hours of application and completes forfeiture within 6 months. International mutual legal assistance treaties are activated for offshore assets within 30 days of identification.

10.2 The Institutional Redesign — EACC Becomes KIACC

The Kenya Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission is the successor to the EACC. The name change signals structural reform, not cosmetic rebranding. The new institution has different powers, different capacity, different accountability, and different performance metrics from its predecessor.

KIACC Element	Specification
Leadership appointment	The KIACC Director General is appointed through a transparent process: open advertisement, a selection panel including a judge, a representative of civil society, and an international anti-corruption expert, with the shortlist submitted to Parliament for approval before appointment. The DG serves a single non-renewable 6-year term. Removal requires a two-thirds parliamentary majority.
Forensic accounting unit	50 qualified forensic accountants recruited competitively. ACCA, CPA(K), or equivalent plus a minimum 5 years forensic investigation experience. Led by a Chief Forensic Investigator at Director level. The unit is the primary investigative resource for major financial crimes. Its findings are the basis for prosecution.
Prosecutorial team	10 Senior State Counsel seconded from the AG's office to KIACC on 3-year tours. They prosecute corruption cases above Ksh 100 million without DPP approval. They operate under the supervision of the DG, not the DPP. Independence of prosecution is the critical reform — the DPP's ability to decline politically inconvenient prosecutions is the most significant structural failure in the current system.
Budget independence	KIACC's budget is allocated by Parliament directly through a dedicated constitutional fund. It does not pass through the Interior Ministry or Treasury in a way that allows executive interference. The DG presents KIACC's budget request directly to the Parliamentary Finance Committee.
Annual performance report	KIACC publishes an annual report with: referrals received by source; investigations opened and closed;

KIACC Element	Specification
	prosecutions initiated; convictions secured; assets frozen and forfeited; cases referred to DPP and outcomes. This report goes on the National Governance Dashboard alongside GDP and fiscal data. The corruption tax — the proportion of public expenditure lost to corruption — is estimated annually and published as a headline indicator.
National programme mandate	KIACC has a specific mandate to investigate corruption in national programme contracts and institutions. Every programme institution — KSBC, KRCC, KRC, KWCMC, KNAC, Settlement Maintenance Corps, KLIC, KAERS, KISC, KFPEC, the NHB, the Urban Land Bank, the Sports Institutes, KECA — submits annual procurement data to KIACC for pattern analysis. KIACC's Financial Crimes Unit in the NPS (Section Six) is the operational arm for police-work in national programme corruption investigations. ENERGY CONTRACT MONITORING: The Energy Sector Sovereign Protection Act requires KECA to publish every energy contract above Ksh 500M within 48 hours of execution — the most complete public audit trail of energy contracting any African government has generated. KIACC's Forensic Accounting Unit reviews every published energy contract for: capacity payment arrangements that may breach the statutory cap; change orders above 10% that bypass KECA approval; currency risk allocation exceeding 50% to the state; and tariff structures that diverge materially from KECA model terms. A procuring entity that signs a contract violating the Energy Sector Sovereign Protection Act commits procurement fraud under existing law — not merely a regulatory breach. KIACC is the prosecuting authority.

10.3 The Fast-Track Asset Recovery System

Asset recovery is the measure of anti-corruption seriousness that the public understands most clearly. Prosecution matters. Conviction matters. But a conviction that leaves the convicted person's family in possession of the stolen wealth sends a message that corruption is a rational investment — the expected return exceeds the expected cost. Asset recovery closes this calculation.

Asset Recovery Element	Specification
The Fast-Track Division	A specialist division of the High Court dedicated to asset recovery proceedings. Three judges assigned full-time.

Asset Recovery Element	Specification
	Target: freezing orders within 48 hours of application; forfeiture proceedings concluded within 6 months of charge; civil recovery proceedings (where criminal conviction is not obtained) concluded within 12 months.
Unexplained Wealth Orders	A new legal instrument allowing KIACC to require any public officer or contractor to explain the legitimate origin of assets whose value significantly exceeds their known income. Failure to provide an adequate explanation within 90 days is a rebuttable presumption of corruption. The burden of proof is on the holder of the asset to demonstrate legitimate origin — reversing the usual burden in civil asset recovery.
International cooperation	Kenya activates mutual legal assistance treaties with the UK, US, UAE, Switzerland, and South Africa — the primary offshore asset destinations for Kenyan corruption proceeds — within the first year of the programme. A dedicated KIACC international cooperation officer manages these relationships. Offshore asset freezing requests are submitted within 30 days of identification.
Recovered asset use	Assets forfeited through the recovery programme are paid into a National Development Fund ring-fenced for programme priorities identified by Parliament. They are not returned to consolidated revenue. The public can see that recovered stolen assets are being used for specific development purposes — a political incentive for the government to pursue recovery aggressively.

10.4 Critical National Infrastructure Security

The national programme creates a set of assets whose security failure would be catastrophic — not merely disruptive. The loss of the Kenya Energy Tribunal's case management system, the sabotage of the KISC integrated steel mill, a cyberattack on the KNAC national dispatch system, or the breach of the KRC network's signalling infrastructure could each generate cascading failures across multiple programme sectors. These are not hypothetical risks — they are the exact categories of incident that state and non-state adversaries target in peer economies.

Critical Asset	Security Architecture
KISC Integrated Steel Mill — Dongo Kundu	The KISC mill is classified Critical National Infrastructure from Year 1 of construction. The Dongo

Critical Asset	Security Architecture
SEZ	Kundu SEZ has dedicated security perimeter — the NPS Industrial Security Service manages the perimeter. KISC's process control systems (blast furnace management, BOF endpoint detection, continuous casting automation) are air-gapped from the public internet and managed on a closed industrial network under NIS monitoring. Physical sabotage of the blast furnace or the rolling mill would take the programme's primary domestic steel supply offline for 12–24 months — the economic consequence is measured in tens of billions. The NPS Industrial Security Service maintains a 24-hour physical security presence at the mill from first steel (Year 7) and at the construction site from Year 2.
KRC Network — Nine Corridor Battalions	The KRC's 4,572km signalling and train management system is critical transport infrastructure. Signalling sabotage can cause collision; track sabotage in remote ASAL corridors may go undetected for hours. The KRC Corps Commander and the Director of Internal Security maintain a standing Railway Security Protocol covering: KDF security escort in the three highest-threat corridors (Garissa–Mandera, Turkana NW Resource Line, Ethiopia crossing); NPS Rail Police Unit at all stations and major freight nodes; NIS monitoring of the signalling network's digital infrastructure; and community engagement along all corridors through the Community Rail Trust structure — the community whose land the track crosses is the first line of intelligence about threats to that infrastructure.
KECA Digital Platform — Energy Contract Registry	The KECA 48-hour publication platform holds the complete record of Kenya's energy contracting — every contract, every change order, every tariff determination. A cyberattack that corrupts or destroys this record would eliminate the audit trail that the Energy Sector Sovereign Protection Act depends on. The platform is hosted on Wingu la Taifa with the highest security classification. NIS monitors for intrusion attempts. KECA's IT security team has a standing incident response protocol. Mirror backup in geographically separated location updated every 6 hours.
KNAC National Emergency Operations Centre	The NEOC is the dispatch hub for a 2,650-vehicle fleet and 47 county dispatch commands serving a life-safety mission. A DDOS attack or physical compromise of the NEOC does not merely disrupt a government service — it kills people. The NEOC operates on a fully redundant architecture: primary NEOC in Nairobi, secondary NEOC at an undisclosed location, county dispatch commands capable of autonomous operation for 72 hours

Critical Asset	Security Architecture
	if national connectivity is lost. NIS provides the cyber threat intelligence; KNAC's IT security team manages the response.
Wingu la Taifa — National Government Cloud	All programme digital systems — ArdhiSasa, NHB loan system, NIAS, KNAC dispatch, KECA platform, KRC train management, health records — are hosted on Wingu la Taifa. A catastrophic failure of the national cloud has programme-wide consequences. Wingu la Taifa is hosted at three geographically separated data centres (Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu) with automatic failover. NIS has a dedicated Government Cloud Security Cell monitoring for state-level intrusion attempts 24 hours per day.

11.1 The Philosophy

Imprisonment is the punishment. The loss of liberty is the sentence imposed by the court. Everything that happens inside a Kenyan prison should be oriented toward ensuring that the person who leaves is less likely to reoffend than the person who entered — more skilled, more psychologically stable, more connected to legitimate economic opportunity, and less connected to criminal networks. A prison system that achieves this is not soft on crime. It is the most effective crime reduction investment the state can make.

Kenya's current prison system achieves the opposite. 55,000 prisoners in facilities designed for 30,000. Dormitory warehousing that mixes first-time minor offenders with experienced violent criminals. No systematic psychological support. No vocational training at scale. A release process that hands a person their possessions at the gate with no housing, no employment, and no support — and then measures the 'success' of the system by conviction rates rather than reoffending rates. The current system produces more dangerous people than it receives.

11.2 The Tiered Structure — Ending Cross-Contamination

Your most important structural point: the current system cross-contaminates. A 19-year-old serving 18 months for a first petty theft offence serves their sentence alongside experienced gang members, organised criminals, and people with long violent records. They leave with criminal networks, criminal skills, and a criminal identity they did not have on entry. The prison has made them more dangerous. The tiered structure prevents this.

Tier	Population	Regime and Philosophy
Tier 1 — Remand and Assessment	Persons awaiting trial. Constitutionally presumed innocent. Currently mixed with convicted prisoners in violation of both the Constitution and basic justice. Tier 1 facilities are remand-specific, with no contact with convicted prisoners. Assessment centre function: psychological assessment, NIAS access, legal aid connection. Target: no remand prisoner held for more than 6 months without trial — cases exceeding this trigger automatic court review.	Full access to legal representation. Visits without restriction. Own clothing permitted. No punitive conditions — these are people awaiting trial, not convicted.
Tier 2 — First Offence, Non-Violent, Below 3 Years	Young and first-time non-violent offenders. The population most at risk of criminal contamination and most amenable to rehabilitation. Completely separate from Tier 3 and 4. Open-regime where possible — structured day, freedom of movement within the facility,	Mandatory psychological assessment within 30 days. Individual rehabilitation plan within 60 days. KNQF vocational training mandatory from month 2. NIAS assessment. Family contact actively facilitated — weekly visits, video call access. Parole eligibility from 40% of sentence for those demonstrating programme participation.

Tier	Population	Regime and Philosophy
	responsibility for own space.	
Tier 3 — Repeat Offenders and Medium Sentences (3–10 years)	More structured regime but still rehabilitation-focused. The evidence shows that even repeat offenders respond to quality rehabilitation programmes — the key variable is whether the programme is genuine or nominal.	Intensive psychological programme. KNQF training — by a 3-year sentence a prisoner can complete a full Level 3 qualification and begin Level 4. Graduated privileges tied to programme participation. Restorative justice options where victim is willing.
Tier 4 — Long Sentences and High Risk (above 10 years)	Maximum security. The most intensive security but also the most intensive psychological support — long sentences without rehabilitation produce the most dangerous releases.	Specialist psychological support. Structured daily programme mandatory. Education to KNQF Level 4 and above available. Family contact maintained even at maximum security — the evidence on family contact and reoffending is unambiguous.
Tier 5 — Community Supervision	Short sentences below 1 year for non-violent first offenders served in the community. Electronic tagging, probation officer supervision, community service, regular reporting. Keeps minor offenders out of prison environments entirely.	Community service hours: 200 hours for a 6-month equivalent sentence. Electronic tag: curfew 10pm–6am. Monthly court review. Reoffending during community supervision converts automatically to custodial sentence.

11.3 The Psychology Programme

This is the reform you specifically identified as essential and you are correct. A rehabilitation system without psychological support is a skills training programme in a distressed environment — the skills acquired are overwhelmed by the psychological damage that produced the offending behaviour in the first place. The programme designs a genuine Psychology and Rehabilitation function in every tier of the prison system.

Psychology Programme Element	Specification
Staffing	Every prison above 200 prisoners has a Psychology and Rehabilitation Unit with a minimum ratio of one psychologist per 50 prisoners in Tier 2 and 3, one per 30 in Tier 4. Psychologists are recruited from the university clinical psychology programmes — Chuo Kuu ya Taifa mandates clinical psychology as a university programme at all universities with a medical school. The prison service offers a 30% salary premium over the standard public health psychology rate to attract and retain qualified staff.
Mandatory assessment	Every prisoner receives a psychological assessment within 30 days of arrival. The assessment identifies: mental health conditions requiring treatment; substance abuse requiring rehabilitation; trauma history; cognitive profile for vocational training; risk factors for reoffending. The assessment produces an Individual Rehabilitation Plan.
Individual Rehabilitation Plan	The IRP is the prisoner's personal development plan for their sentence. It specifies: psychological treatment requirements; vocational training programme; education plan; family contact arrangements; parole preparation timeline. It is reviewed every 6 months by the psychologist and the prisoner together. Progress against the IRP affects parole eligibility — not as a punitive measure but as a genuine assessment of rehabilitation readiness.
Substance abuse treatment	A significant proportion of Kenya's prison population has substance abuse issues that are causally related to their offending. The psychology programme includes a structured Substance Abuse Rehabilitation Programme — not just group meetings but clinical treatment, including medication where appropriate, with certified addiction counsellors.
Mental health treatment	Many prisoners have undiagnosed and untreated mental health conditions. Psychosis, bipolar disorder, severe

Psychology Programme Element	Specification
	depression, PTSD — these conditions, untreated, make rehabilitation impossible and reoffending highly probable. The programme provides diagnosis and treatment for all identified conditions. Prisoners with severe mental illness who cannot safely be managed in a prison environment are transferred to secure mental health facilities under the health programme.

11.4 The Infrastructure Redesign

Kenya's current prison infrastructure is largely Victorian in design and condition — built for maximum control, not for rehabilitation. Dormitory halls holding 200 prisoners in space designed for 50. No workshop space. No education rooms. Shared toilet facilities that are degrading. The physical environment communicates to the prisoner that they are warehoused, not being prepared for return to society.

The programme rebuilds prisons on the Scandinavian-influenced model over a fifteen-year programme:

- Single or double occupancy rooms rather than dormitory halls. Privacy is not a luxury in a rehabilitation system — it is the basic condition of individual responsibility and self-respect.
- Workshop and vocational training spaces equal to 20% of total floor area. Prisons are training facilities as well as custodial facilities. The workshop is where the KNQF qualification happens.
- Education rooms with computer terminals and internet access to educational resources (monitored, not open). A prisoner working toward a KNQF Level 4 qualification needs educational resources.
- A psychological services suite — assessment rooms, group therapy space, quiet rooms for individual sessions. Not a corner of a corridor. A designed space.
- Family visit areas designed for normal interaction — seated at a table, not through glass partitions. The evidence on family contact and reoffending is unambiguous: prisoners who maintain strong family contact reoffend at significantly lower rates.
- Kitchen facilities where Tier 2 and Tier 3 prisoners cook their own food under supervision. The cooking programme is itself rehabilitation — it builds routine, responsibility, practical skill, and connection to the daily life they will return to.
- Outdoor space and physical activity facilities. A healthy body and a structured physical programme are foundational to psychological health.

The rebuilding programme proceeds in priority order: the most overcrowded facilities first, the remand-to-convicted separation second, the specialist psychological services third. The capital cost is funded through the national programme infrastructure budget with a specific prison modernisation allocation. The long-term economic case is straightforward: a rehabilitated prisoner who does not reoffend costs the state nothing after release. A reoffending prisoner costs the state an arrest, a prosecution, and another custodial sentence. The rehabilitation investment has a high return.

11.5 The Pre-Release Programme

The current practice — releasing a person at the prison gate with their personal possessions and nothing else — is the system's final failure. A person with no housing, no employment, no money, and no support who reoffends within weeks is not a moral failure. They are a predictable outcome of a system that does not prepare people for release.

Pre-Release Element	Specification
NES engagement	The National Employment Service engages with every prisoner above 6 months remaining in their sentence. NES case manager assigned. NIAS assessment conducted. KNQF certificate preparation confirmed. The case manager's job: ensure that on the day of release, the prisoner has a confirmed employment pathway, a confirmed housing arrangement, and a confirmed support contact. Not a hope. A confirmation.
KNQF certificate completion	The vocational training programme in Tier 2 and 3 prisons is designed so that a prisoner serving a 2-year sentence can complete a full KNQF Level 3 qualification. A 3-year sentence allows Level 4. The certificate is issued in the same format and with the same value as any other KNQF certificate — it does not identify the holder as a prison graduate. It is simply a qualification.
Housing support	The Nyumba ya Taifa social rental stock reserves a proportion of units — 3% of all social rental units nationally — for released prisoners who have no family accommodation. The NES case manager applies on the prisoner's behalf 3 months before release. Units are allocated anonymously — neighbours do not know the occupant's history. The housing is a bridge, not a permanent arrangement: the expectation is that the occupant transitions to independent tenancy within 18 months.
Family reintegration	Where the prisoner has a family unit to return to, the

Pre-Release Element	Specification
support	Psychology Unit conducts a family reintegration session in the final month before release. The session addresses: what has changed during the sentence, expectations for the return, practical arrangements, and access to family counselling if the return is to a difficult situation.
Probation supervision	All released prisoners above a 2-year sentence are subject to probation supervision for a period equal to 25% of their sentence. The probation officer is a point of accountability and a point of support — not simply a monitor. Monthly check-ins. Connection to NES if employment is lost. Connection to NHIF for health support. Reoffending during probation is reported to the court within 24 hours.

SECTION TWELVE

The Twenty-Year Trajectory

Phase	Targets and Milestones
Years 1–3: Foundations	KMEC incorporated and first contracts bid. NYSC incorporated. NYS governance reform enacted. NPS departmental restructure complete — all 8 departments operational with separate directorates. Traffic M-Pesa system live in Nairobi. Body cameras: all Nairobi patrol officers. KIACC established with forensic accounting unit. CAG automatic referral protocol live. Fast-Track Asset Recovery Division operational. Prison tier separation complete in Nairobi and Mombasa prisons. Psychology units established in 5 priority prisons. Pre-release NES programme live nationally.
Years 3–6: Scale and Operation	KMEC: first major bridge contract completed. NYSC: 200 community infrastructure projects delivered. Fire service: Level 1 stations in all 47 county headquarters. NYS pipeline: 20,000 recruits per year completing 12-month programme and entering corps pathways. NPS body cameras: all patrol officers nationally. Digital case management: all 47 counties. ANPR: 50 cameras live. KIACC: first 10 major prosecutions under new prosecutorial mandate. Prison modernisation: 10 facilities rebuilt to new standard. Prison psychology: all Tier 2 prisons covered. Reoffending rate baseline established.
Years 6–12: Structural Change	KMEC: established as a credible major infrastructure bidder with 5+ delivered projects above Ksh 5 billion. NPS: annual

Phase	Targets and Milestones
	Citizen Security Survey shows community trust above 50% for the first time (from estimated 20% baseline). Traffic fatalities: 30% reduction. KIACC: Corruption Tax indicator falling — measurable reduction in programme procurement corruption. Prison overcrowding: below 120% (from 180% baseline). Prison reoffending: below 30% at 2 years (from estimated 60% baseline).
Years 12–20: Legacy	KMEC and NYSC: combined they are among the top 5 infrastructure contractors in Kenya by contract value. NPS: community trust above 65%. Traffic fatalities: 50% reduction. No officer in any department working more than 12 months without a body camera. KIACC: prosecution success rate above 70%. Asset recovery: Ksh 5 billion recovered and directed to the National Development Fund over the programme period. Prisons: overcrowding eliminated. Reoffending below 25% at 2 years. The prison service is measurably a rehabilitation system, not a criminal training ground.

ULINZI NA USALAMA YA TAIFA — National Defence and Interior Security. *WORKING DOCUMENT — Year One.*

This document forms part of the Kenya National Development Programme. KMEC and NYSC connect to Viwanda ya Taifa, Nyumba ya Taifa, Diplomasia ya Taifa, and every infrastructure programme. The police reform connects to Jinsia ya Taifa (SGBV response), Utamaduni wa Taifa (sports integrity), Madini ya Taifa (mining security), and Haki ya Taifa (justice). KIACC connects to every programme document's anti-corruption architecture. The prison reform connects to Kazi ya Taifa (NES pre-release) and Nyumba ya Taifa (social rental for released prisoners).

PROGRAMME INTEGRATION APPENDIX

Ulinzi na Usalama — Defence and Security — Cross-Programme Integration, Employment Summary and Legal Register

A. Employment Summary

Institution / Role	Permanent	Entry-Level	Entry Qualification and Pathway

KMEC permanent staff	3,000–5,000	2,000	Engineering apprentices, site operatives, equipment operators — KNQF Level 3–5. Seconded KDF, retired KDF civilians, commercially recruited.
NYSC permanent employed project workers	5,000–8,000	5,000–8,000	ALL NYS graduates — KNQF Level 3 construction or civil works. ALL entry-level.
NYS Pipeline annual throughput	20,000 /year	20,000 /year	ALL entry-level. 12 months: KNQF Level 3 vocational + KDF field survival + NIAS + corps referral. Largest single annual entry-level intake in the programme.
National Fire and Rescue Service	4,700	4,700	ALL entry-level. KNQF Level 3, 6-month NYS Fire and Rescue Training College. Progression pathway to crew commander.
NPS Rail Police Unit	2,000	1,500	New NPS specialisation. Standard NPS recruit entry plus KRC-specific training.
KIACC staff	500	100	Forensic accountants (ACCA/CPA(K) + 5 years), graduate forensic trainees (entry-level), prosecutorial counsel.
Prison Psychology and Rehabilitation Units	2,000	500	Clinical psychologists (KNQF Level 7), addiction counsellors, vocational supervisors.
Incremental NPS specialist departments (GVIU, Cybercrime, Environmental, Financial)	3,000	1,500	Specialist NPS officers — KNQF Level 5+ in relevant specialisation. Recruited from NPS general pool plus specialist training.

Employment Summary	**Figure**
Total permanent positions (Year 10 steady state)	~38,200+ permanent (excluding NYS pipeline throughput)
Entry-level positions (KNQF Level 2–5)	~25,300
Reference — full programme employment register	Programme Integration Index (PII) Section Two

B. Cross-Programme Linkages

Every linkage below names the specific institution, data system, or instrument that creates the interface. Vague references are not listed — only confirmed operational connections.

Links To	**Specific Linkage — Institution, Data System, or Instrument at the Interface**
Ujenzi na	KMEC is the fourth competitive construction force: bids

Miundombinu	alongside KSBC, KRCC, and private contractors. Fills the ASAL/strategic gap. NYSC is the community-scale delivery partner. The NIDCU doctrine (Ujenzi) assigns mandates: KSBC builds buildings, KRCC builds roads, KMEC handles ASAL/strategic/cross-border, NYSC handles community-scale.
KRC Vision / KRC Corps Act	Rail Police Unit: 9 sub-units co-located at 9 KRC Corridor Battalion operations centres. Rail Police Unit Director maintains standing coordination with KRC Corps Commander. KDF escort for 3 highest-threat corridors.
Jinsia ya Taifa	GVIU (Gender Violence Investigation Unit) is the prosecution end of Jinsia's SGBV response architecture. Every SGBV referral from Jinsia's Gender Desk goes to GVIU for criminal investigation. GVIU and SGBV courts (in CJHs) operate as a criminal justice system designed specifically for gender violence.
Afya ya Taifa	KAF-KNAC airspace coordination: standing airspace access agreement, dedicated air emergency frequency, night operations protocol. CMMC Framework: KDF medical facilities serve civilian ASAL populations. KDF Medical Corps knowledge transfer to KNAC Academy. Mass casualty joint exercises.
Haki ya Taifa	KIACC is designed in Ulinzi but prosecutes through Haki's Anti-Corruption Court Division. NPS Financial Crimes Unit (Ulinzi) is the police arm for KIACC investigations. Asset recovery (UWOs, Fast-Track Division) operates through Haki's courts.
Nyumba ya Taifa	3% of social rental stock reserved for released prisoners who have no family accommodation — NES case manager applies 3 months before release. Units allocated anonymously.
Kazi ya Taifa	Prison pre-release: NES engages with every prisoner 6 months before release. NES case manager assigned, NIAS assessment conducted, KNQF certificate preparation confirmed, employment pathway confirmed before release date. NYS Pipeline runs through NIAS — aptitude assessment is mandatory within the 12-month programme.
Diplomasia ya Taifa	KMEC as preferred Kenyan bidder for EAC connectivity projects: Taveta-Moshi bridge, Moyale border infrastructure, EAC road corridor improvements. Cross-border infrastructure builds Kenya's standing as EAC's infrastructure partner.
Mfumo wa Katiba	KIACC Act (Tier 1 Year 1), NYS Reform Act (Tier 1 Year 1), NPS Reform Acts (Tier 1–3), Prison Service Reform Act (Tier 2 Year 2), Unexplained Wealth Orders Act (Tier 4 Year 4). KMEC Act and National Fire and Rescue Service Act are CURRENTLY MISSING from Mfumo wa Katiba's statutory register — flagged for correction.

C. Legal Instruments and Constitutional Protection

Legal Instrument	Year	Pathway
KIACC Act — successor to Ethics and	Year 1	Simple majority

Anti-Corruption Commission Act		
NYS Reform Act — NYSC separation, independent board, procurement transparency	Year 1	Simple majority
KMEC Act — Ksh 20B capitalisation, KDF holding structure — MISSING FROM MFUMO WA KATIBA	Year 1	Simple majority
National Fire and Rescue Service Act — NYS institutional home, statutory response standards, industrial levy — MISSING FROM MFUMO WA KATIBA	Year 2	Simple majority
Prison Service Reform Act — 5-tier structure, psychology mandate, rehabilitation obligation	Year 2	Simple majority
Unexplained Wealth Orders / Asset Recovery Act	Year 4	Simple majority
NPS Reform Acts (multiple amending instruments)	Year 1–3	Simple majority

D. Live Metrics and Accountability

Full cross-reference detail: Programme Integration Index (PII) — Sections 1, 2, and 3.
Live metrics: National Governance Dashboard — Security and Integrity Module. Daily: KIACC open investigations count and assets frozen value. Monthly: NPS Citizen Security Survey (annual, but monthly partial data), prison occupancy rate per facility (target below 120%), reoffending rate at 2 years (target below 30% by Year 10), KMEC and NYSC active contracts and delivery status. Annual: Corruption Tax indicator.